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Recent Developments 
State v. Cain: 
Theft By Deception is Complete When the Respondent Obtains Control of the 
Victims Property Through the Agency of a Common Carrier in Maryland 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
Maryland trial court has territorial 
jurisdiction over a prosecution for 
theft by deception in violation of 
Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 342, 
where a victim in Maryland was 
deceived by an accused located in 
Georgia, via the Internet, and thereby 
induced to mail a check to the 
accused in Georgia, in exchange for 
goods, which, proved not to be as 
the accused represented them. State 
v. Cain, 360 Md. 205,757 A.2d 142 
(2000). In so holding, the court has 
established that to exercise 
jurisdiction for the crime of theft by 
deception, the essential element of 
respondent obtaining control of a 
subject's property is complete upon 
the victim delivering the property 
to an agent of the accused, in the 
case at bar through the agency of 
the U.S. Postal Service. 
Respondent Mary Jean Cain 
("Cain"), a resident of Georgia, 
placed an advertisement on the 
Internet to sell a "mint" collection 
of ninety-five Barbie dolls in their 
original boxes, stating that the dolls 
and boxes were all in "collector's 
condition." Debbie Ann Amyot 
("Amyot"), a resident of Maryland, 
saw the advertisement and responded 
to it via Internet e-mail and telephone 
calls to respondent's home in Georgia. 
Amyot agreed to buy the entire doll 
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collection for $6,140. On August 28, 
1998, Amyot mailed a check 
payable to Cain in that amount to 
Cain's home in Georgia. On 
September 9, 1998, Amyot received 
by mail thirty-six Barbie dolls in 
boxes, all of which were in poor 
condition, thereby having little 
collector value. Amyot contacted 
Cain and requested to return the 
dolls. Cain terminated contact with 
Amyot. Georgia police would not 
investigate because the 
investigation had been initiated in 
Maryland. 
On January 21, 1999, Cain was 
charged under§ 342 in the District 
Court of Maryland, with one count 
of theft by deception of property 
with a value of $300 or more. 
Respondent moved to dismiss on the 
ground that Maryland lacked 
territorial jurisdiction. The district 
court granted the motion. The State 
appealed to the circuit court, which 
affirmed the judgment. The State 
petitioned the court of appeals for writ 
of certiorari. 
The court began its analysis by 
pointing out that neither the 
Maryland Constitution nor the 
Annotated Code of Maryland 
addresses jurisdiction over the 
offense of theft by deception. !d. at 
211, 757 A.2d at 145. Therefore, 
they turned to the common law. !d. 
at 212, 757 A.2d at 145. The court 
stated that the general rule under the 
common law is that "a state may 
punish only those crimes committed 
within its territorial limits." Jd. 
(citing Pennington v. State, 308 
Md. 727, 730, 521 A.2d 1216, 
1217 (1987)). Furthermore, the 
court noted that it was clear under 
common law that an accused's 
actual presence in the state at the 
time the crime was committed is 
not necessary. Id. at212, 757 A.2d 
at 146. When a crime transcends 
state lines the court has to make a 
determination of whether an offense 
is committed within Maryland's 
jurisdiction. Id. at 213, 757 A.2d 
at 146. "Ifthe various elements of 
a given offense do not all occur 
within the borders of a single state, 
it becomes necessary to decide in 
which state the offense has been 
'committed."' Id. at 213-214, 757 
A.2d at 146. (citing Penningtion, 
308 Md. at 730,521 A.2dat 1217). 
The court noted that this 
question has been decided in 
various ways. ld. at 214,757 A.2d 
at 14 7. Case law from other 
jurisdictions has asserted, for 
jurisdictional purposes, that a 
crime may have several essential 
elements, that where these occur in 
several states, each such state has 
jurisdiction. !d. After a review of 
Maryland law and case law from 
other states, the court stated that the 
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essential element of the crime of theft 
by deception, for jurisdictional 
purposes, is when the accused 
obtains control of the subject's 
property. !d. at 216, 757 A.2d at 
14 7. Thus, ''the offender may be tried 
where the property was obtained." !d. 
at 216,757 A.2d at 148. 
The court then reviewed case 
law from other jurisdictions that 
support the proposition that when 
one uses deception to gain control 
of another's property, and the subject 
delivers the property by mail, 
control is obtained when the 
property is put in the mail. !d. at 
216-217, 757 A.2d at 149. The 
court pointed out that there was 
some case law to the contrary, 
saying that control is obtained when 
actually received, not when mailed, 
but the court rejected this view. !d. 
at 218-219, 757 A.2d at 149. The 
court stated that the better view of the 
element of gaining control of the 
property is accomplished by looking 
at when the victim surrenders their 
property to the control of the accused, 
whether personally or through the 
defrauding party's agent. !d. at 219, 
757 A.2d at 149. 
The court noted that "where 
one absent from a state commits a 
crime therein through an innocent 
agent the absentee is liable in the 
state in which the crime was 
committed to indictment, trial and 
conviction." !d. at 220, 757 A.2d at 
150 (quoting Urciolo v. State, 272 
Md. 607, 631, 325 A.2d 878, 892 
(1974)). The court then went on to 
state that this principle has been 
applied in cases in which the innocent 
agent was a common carrier, and the 
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accused acts through the common 
carrier, by requesting the property be 
delivered to the carrier, to be shipped 
to the accused outside the jurisdiction. 
!d. at 220, 221, 757 A.2d at 151. 
Relying upon the principle that an 
accused obtains control when a victim, 
relying on the accused's 
representation, deposits the property 
to the United States Postal Service, 
an innocent agent or a common 
carrier. !d. The court noted that under 
Maryland statute, the check itself is 
considered property and it does not 
have to be cashed first to gain value. 
!d. at 222, 757 A.2d at 151. 
Finally, the court briefly 
discussed the argument that the 
federal statutes on mail and wire 
fraud preempt state laws involving 
the mail or electronic 
communications. !d. at 223, 757 
A.2d at 151. The court again turned 
to case law from other jurisdictions 
that have held there was no 
preemption, because there was "no 
support for the proposition that the 
federal interest in preventing fraud 
or deception through the use of the 
United States mails is so dominant 
as to preclude any state laws on the 
subject." !d. at223, 757 A.2dat 152 
(quoting Conte & Co. v. Stephan, 
713 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Kan. 
1989)). The court adopted this view 
and ruled that the federal statutes 
criminalizing fraud by mail and wire 
do not preempt § 342 as applied to 
crimes involving the use of the mail 
and/or telephone. !d. at 224, 757 
A.2d at 152. 
The holding in State v. Cain is 
an important step taken in Maryland 
in prosecuting residents from other 
jurisdictions who deceive and/or 
defraud Maryland residents of their 
property via the Internet, telephone 
and/or electronic communications, 
when the property, is sent by mail or 
common carrier from Maryland to 
the accused out of state. This is 
especially important with the 
widespread use of the Internet. 
Maryland resident will have judicial 
recourse in Maryland, thus making it 
more convenient for them to 
prosecute, without having to travel out 
of state to retrieve or receive 
compensation for the stolen property. 
